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1. Introduction 
The profitability of hospitals has been a subject of interest to academic 
economists for at least two decades.  Recently, it has also been a topic of interest in the 
popular press.  The literature has addressed this topic from several perspectives.   
The vast majority of the research on hospital profitability has examined the 
relative performance of for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals or compared the similarities 
and differences of these methods of control.  Rosenau (2003) and Shen et. al (2005) each 
document approximately 75 scholarly articles addressing this topic.  Recent additions to 
this literature include Potter (2001), McClellan and Staiger (2000), Silverman and 
Skinner (2001) and Chakravarty et. al. (2006).   
Examinations as to the factors leading to hospital profitability have been less 
numerable.  These studies, exemplified by Morey and Dittman (1984), Dafney (2003), 
and Friedman et al. al. (2004), have concentrated on the link between hospital payment 
source and profitability, neglecting the supply side of the market.  On the supply side, the 
profitability of particular hospital departments has been a subject of study.  Browne and 
Kuo (2004) and Henneman, Tomaszewski, and Mayforth (2006) both examine the 
relative profits generated from patients admitted to hospitals through emergency 
departments with non emergency patients. A hospital’s ability to generate profits though 
its pharmacy and pediatric burn centers is discussed, respectively, by Grauer (1983) and 
Corpron, Martin, Roberts, and Besner (2004).  
As far as we are aware, little literature exists studying the relative profitability of 
the various services provided by hospitals.  This is interesting considering that 
historically when estimating cost functions researchers have treated hospitals as multi-
product firms, providing a host of services [ Lave and Lave (1970), Evans (1971), 
(Coverdale, Gibbs, and Nurse (1980), Cowing and Holtman (1983), and Adam, Evans, 
and Murray (2003)]. 
The purpose of the present study is to provide a brief analysis of the profitability 
of the various outpatient patient services offered by a sample of hospitals.  Preliminary 
analysis of the profitability of inpatient services has been undertaken by Hegji (2007).  A 
natural extension of this analysis is to examine the profitability of outpatient care. 
Although primarily descriptive, the present analysis does suggest some tentative 
conclusions concerning the relative profitability of these services.  
Section 2 of the paper discusses our data set and statistical techniques.  Our 
results are presented in Section 3.  Concluding comments appear in Section 4.   
 
2. Data and Methodology  
Data on profits were obtained from the American Hospital Directory for a sample 
of 94 Alabama hospitals.  The data is self-reported, and applies to fiscal year ending 
2005.   
Profits were calculated for sixteen different hospital Diagnostic Related Groups 
(DRGs), listed in the Appendix. These services are self-explanatory with the exception of 
possibly neoplasms and external injury and supplemental classification. Neoplasms refers 
to tumors, which could be malignant or benign.  While external injury is self-explanatory, 
the supplemental classification refers to a patient reporting to a hospital outpatient facility 
for tests, MRIs, and similar procedures. 
  Profits for each hospital were calculated as the difference between per patient 
charges and per patient costs and as the difference between per patient costs for each four   2
digit diagnosis. These profits were then averaged for the three digit diagnoses as appear 
in the Appendix.  Finally, the markup of per DRG profit over DRG cost was calculated.   
  A one-way analysis of variance was conducted on the charge and payment 
markup for each DRG. The initial analysis was performed on all sixteen DRGs.  This 
analysis appears in Tables 1 and 2.  
 
3.  Results 
Table 1 shows the mean average markup of charges and payments over costs and 
other summary statistics for the DRGs studied.  The table reveals that the average 
hospital charge markup was at least 100% for all DRGs.  Infectious disease was least 
profitable when measured by charges, with an average markup of 114%.  The most 
profitable markup was for the supplemental classification, with an average markup of 
435%.  
 The markups of payment over cost were, as to be expected, much smaller.  
Undefined conditions generated the smallest average relative payment over cost, 1.69%.  
A reasonable explanation of this is that many of such undefined initial diagnoses were on 
emergency room patients, who are often indigent and non-paying.  Another small markup 
of payment over cost was for circulatory system problems, 3.65%. A reason for the low 
markup is the high cost of providing such care. The most profitable markup, on the other 
hand, was for the low cost DRG, mental disorders. This diagnoses generated an average 
markup of payment over cost of 37.78%.  
Table 2 displays the analysis of variance for the markup of charge over cost and 
payments over cost for the sixteen DRGs used in the study.  The table shows that there 
are significant differences in both profit margins among the DRGs, where significance is 
at a greater than 1% level.  
  To simplify the search for pair wise differences between the profit margins for the 
various DRGs, analysis of variance was run for the four highest average charge markups 
and four highest payment markups. These Diagnosis Related Groups were neoplasms, 
muscle and skeletal problems, ill-defined conditions, and supplemental classification for 
the markup of charges over cost. The four highest markups of payment over cost were 
blood disease, mental disorders, nervous disorders, and supplemental classification. The 
results appear in Tables 3 and 4.   
Since there were no statistically significant differences among the average markup for 
the top four markups of charge over cost and payment over cost, this analysis is not 
displayed in the Tables.  However, there were statistically significance differences among 
the average markup of payment over cost among the four DRGs that ranked highest in 
terms of charge markup.  Conversely, there were statistically significance differences 
among the average markup of charge over cost among the four DRGs that ranked highest 
in terms of payment markup. These differences were in both cases significant at the 2% 
or greater level.   
Tables 3 and 4 also show that there were pair wise differences between the 
profitability of DRGs measured in terms of charge relative to cost and payments relative 
cost. These differences were tested using the Bonferroni procedure.  For the markup of 
payments over cost, supplemental conditions generated a statistically greater markup than 
ill defined conditions at a greater than 1% level.  For the markup of payments over costs, 
supplemental conditions generated a statistically greater markup than mental disorders at 
approximately the 1% level. 
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4.  Conclusions 
This study has been a first step in studying the relative profitability of various 
outpatient services, as classified by Diagnostic Related Groups.  Two conclusions can 
be drawn from the study. 
First, there are significant differences among the profitability of outpatient 
services hospitals offer, both in terms of charges over costs and payments over cost. 
Second, hospitals make particularly high profits on patients coming to outpatient 
facilities for supplemental procedures such as lab work.  
The authors hope this preliminary work encourages others to further delve into the 
study of the profitability of hospital services. 
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Appendix: ICD-9 Codes with At Least One Outpatient Event in Alabama 2006  
 
Codes 001-139: Infectious and parasitic diseases  
Codes 140-239: Neoplasms  
Codes 240-279: Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases, and immunity 
disorders  
Codes 280-289: Diseases of the blood and blood-forming organs  
Codes 290-319: Mental disorders  
Codes 320-359: Diseases of the nervous system  
Codes 360-389: Diseases of the sense organs  
Codes 390-459: Diseases of the circulatory system  
Codes 460-519: Diseases of the respiratory system  
Codes 520-579: Diseases of the digestive system  
Codes 580-629: Diseases of the genitourinary system  
Codes 680-709: Diseases of the skin and subcutaneous tissue  
Codes 710-739: Diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue  
Codes 780-799: Symptoms, signs, and ill-defined conditions  
Codes 800-999: Injury and poisoning  
Codes E and V: External causes of injury and supplemental classification 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Markup over Cost   
       
Infectious diseases      
                   
     Number of Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Markup of Charges   2  113.67% 165.82%  3.59%  230.92% 
Markup of Payments   2  23.90% 49.60% 58.97% 11.18% 
       
Neoplasms       
       
     Number of Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Markup of Charges   162  422.89%  247.34%  2.20%  1461.05% 
Markup of Payments   162  9.53% 46.33%  68.94%  162.40% 
       
Endocrine disorders      
       
     Number of Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Markup of Charges   33  356.13%  275.07%  21.14%  1356.29% 
Markup of Payments   33  25.26% 63.89% 43.21%  270.99% 
       
Blood disease       
       
     Number of Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Markup of Charges   61  332.24% 202.59%  7.00%  966.95% 
Markup of Payments   61  8.91% 40.86%  60.27%  184.42% 
       
Mental disorders      
       
     Number of Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Markup of Charges   10  146.40% 56.81%  2.61%  186.41% 
Markup of Payments   10  37.78% 47.41% 54.25%  136.89% 
       
Nervous disorders      
       
     Number of Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Markup of Charges   17  374.16% 210.55% 141.88% 750.04% 
Markup of Payments   17  27.52% 81.33% 51.92%  246.32% 
       
Eyes and ears      
       
     Number of Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Markup of Charges   77  364.26%  202.03%  24.68%  1005.47% 
Markup of Payments   77  13.24% 34.39% 53.07%  106.12% 
       
Circulatory system      
       
     Number of Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Markup of Charges   223  357.87%  187.57%  1.89%  1098.94% 
Markup of Payments   223  3.65% 36.44%  64.33%  213.86% 
       
Respiratory system      
       
     Number of Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Markup of Charges   67  297.32%  184.21% 72.92% 881.33% 
Markup of Payments   67  11.42% 48.76% 59.33%  226.56% 
       
Table 1: Continued         8
 
Digestive system 
       
     Number of Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Markup of Charges   191  352.61%  223.91%  33.51%  1136.72% 
Markup of Payments   191  7.63% 29.85%  72.99%  88.08% 
       
Urinary tract problems      
       
     Number of Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Markup of Charges   88  405.10%  214.05%  72.92%  1055.92% 
Markup of Payments   88  3.90% 27.13%  61.22%  107.89% 
       
Skin disease      
       
     Number of Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Markup of Charges   10  261.19%  249.52% 37.96% 841.35% 
Markup of Payments   10  14.81% 67.71% 81.53%  165.38% 
       
Muscle and skeletal problems      
       
     Number of Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Markup of Charges   256  427.23%  275.99%  14.88%  1976.06% 
Markup of Payments   256  9.29% 53.68%  79.34%  320.00% 
       
Undefined conditions      
       
     Number of Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Markup of Charges   503  429.98%  260.81%  69.03%  1878.76% 
Markup of Payments   503  1.69% 27.34%  60.34%  226.56% 
       
Injury and poisoning      
       
     Number of Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Markup of Charges   70  407.29%  250.74%  32.61%  1243.68% 
Markup of Payments   70  13.94% 73.80% 57.10%  533.01% 
       
Supplemental classification      
       
     Number of Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Markup of Charges   86  435.47%  311.51%  -18.99%  1599.34% 
Markup of Payments   86  22.30% 72.59% -73.70%  514.67% 
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Table 2: ANOVA  for Sixteen Outpatient DRGs   
      
Markup of Charge over Costs      
      
Source  SS  df  MS  F  Prob > F 
      
Between  groups  378.329491 15 25.2219661  4.26  0 
Within groups  10887.828  1840  5.91729782     
Total 11266.1575 1855 6.07340026     
      
      
Markup of Payment over Costs    
      
Source  SS  df  MS  F  Prob > F 
      
Between groups  12.1367726  15  0.809118174  4.24  0 
Within groups  351.413296  1840  0.190985487     




Table 3: ANOVA for Top 4 DRGs Markup of Charge over Costs   
       
Markup of Payment over Costs 
       
Source  SS  df  MS  F  Prob > F 
       
Between groups  3.6578793  3  1.2192931  6.23  0.0003 
Within groups  196.290493  1003  0.195703382     
Total 199.948372  1006  0.198755837     
       
Individual Difference  Difference  Prob Value       
Supplemental - Ill defined  20.61%  0       
 
 
Table 4: ANOVA of Top 4 DRGs  by Payment Markup 
       
Markup of Charge over Costs 
       
Source  SS  df  MS  F  Prob > F 
       
Between groups  81.3285457  3  27.1095152  3.37  0.0202 
Within groups  1140.79158  142  8.0337435     
Total 1222.12012  145  8.42841464     
       
Individual Difference  Difference  Prob Value       
Supp- Mental Disorder  289.07%  0.016       
 
 
 